Given a wage offer distribution, the parameters of the observed wage distribution depend on the intensity of search. The lower a person's wage demands the greater the chance of his finding an acceptable job, but the lower the wage he expects to receive and the wider the dispersion of acceptable wages around their mean. On the other hand, the job seeker may opt for a more ambitious search strategy, raising his minimum wage demand and consequently increasing the risk of remaining unemployed, but also increasing the expected wage and decreasing the dispersion of the acceptable offers.
Much of the discussion in labor economics concerning labor force participation, wages, and earnings centers on the wage offer distribution. However, the empirical validation of the theory is based on the observed wage distribution. The implicit identification of wage offers with observed wages is particularly suspect when those employed constitute only a fraction of the total population. In this case, the observed distribution represents only one part of the wage offer distribution, the other part being rejected by the job seekers as unacceptable. Thus, the traditional estimation procedures may involve certain biases when applied to the secondary labor groups--married women, teenagers, and the aged. This paper attempts to point out some of these biases and suggests a method for their correction. In the next section we outline a simplified search model. The implicationsof this model for the investigation of labor force participation, discrimination, and the rates of return and rates of depreciation of hunan capital are discussed in the third section. In the fourth section I describe an estimation procedure for the wage_offer distribution using a simplified set of assumptions. The paper closes with a discussion of some results obtained using the new method.
Correcting for what I call the selectivity bias I show that traditional measures underestimate the rate of return to human capital and its rate of depreciation when they are applied to married women.
These measures tend to overstate the white/non-white wage differential, but to understate the wage offer differentials between -3-males and females and between women with and without young children.
The use of data on the average wage of working women yields upward biased estimates of the effect of wages on the labor force participation of married women, as well as overestimates (in absolute terms) of the age and education effects.
The Search Model Economic literature contains a large variety of search models. These models vary in their description of the search behavior and their assumptions about the job seeker's time horizon and his prior knowledge of market conditions. Some authors assume that the job seeker decides ahead of time on the number of searches he will undertake while others adopt a sequential search model. Some assume that the wage-offer distribution is well known, while others postulate that the job seeker revises his assumptions about the distribution as a consequence of the search. Some allow for an infinite time horizon while others restrict the time horizon.
For simplicity let us assume that the job seeker is unemployed, that he adopts a sequential search strategy, that he has perfect knowledge on the job-offer distribution ( where it is assumed that the rate of discount r is constant. Let I be the present value of the income stream the job seeker expects to receive if he continues his search beyond period n (both R and are discounted to period 0); then R W > I , i.e. W > I /R nfl-n n-n n Assuming decisions are made at the end of the period [i.e. offers accepted in period n start yielding returns only in period (n + 1)], the job seeker enjoys in period n an income of W0 -C, where C denotes the costs of search which include both direct costs (e.g. advertisement, employment-agency fees, transportation) and indirect ones (e.g. the value of leisure forgone owing to the search).
Given the wage offer distribution f(W) and the asking wage W*,there exists a probability of that the job seeker will accept a job in period n, where
n n n n An acceptable job will yield on the average a wage of E, where
n n n-n P w n If the offer received in period n is found to be unacceptable [an event whose assigned probability is -the job seeker can still look forward to an expected income stream of I. A job seeker embarking on search in period n can, therefore, expect an income stream of
where r is the rate of discount. Given the infinite time horizon, the constant rate of discount, constant costs of search (C), constant current earnings (WO) and a constant wage-offer distribution [f(W)], the job seeker in period n + 1 is faced by the same conditions facing the job seeker in period n. Hence, the same optimum strategy that was employed in period n will be adopted in period (n + 1), i.e. W = W÷ = Consequently, the present value of the returns to search in period n (discounted to period n) should equal the present value of the returns to search in period (n + 1) [discounted to period (n + 1)]. Put differently,
Moreover, the probability of acceptance (P) and the average acceptable wage (E) remain constant over time.
Inserting equations (5) and (1) in equation (4) and given that = W, P P, and E = E for every n, the asking wage equals5 {r(W0 -C) + PE]. (6) In other words, the minimum acceptable wage will be such as to equate the cost of search plus forgone earnings with the net returns from search E -
The lower boundary of W is W0. Let p0 be the probability that Other things being equal, an increase in the job seeker's price of time (W0) reduces the forgone earnings associated with the rejection of any wage offer (W* -W0) and thus increases the job seeker's wage demands, though at a lower rate than the increase in the price of time dW* = r dW0 dW0.
The increase in wage demands reduces the probability of employment dP = .f(W*)dW* = -r f(W*)dwO < 0 ,
but increases the average acceptable wage (12) resulting in an increase in the probability of employment dP = f(w*)Cdpw
The increase in the wage demands intensifies the effect of the shift of f(W) on the expected acceptable wage offer. The average acceptable wage increases, though at a slower rate than the shift in
When the shift in the wage-offer distribution is accompanied by an increase in the price of time the tendency to enter the labor force increases as long as dl.!w > dW0. Both the shift in f(W) and the increase in W0, tend to increase wage demands. Assuming dW0 < dJ.lw, wage demands increase at a slower rate than the shift in Mw(dW* < d1iq), resulting in both an increase in the probability of employment and an increase in the average acceptable wage (the latter however changing more slowly than
The Wage Offer Distribution versus The Observed Wage Distribution:
The Selectivity Bias Several ingenious methods haVe been devised to overcome these shortcomings.
One bias that seems to have escaped economists' attention is that introduced by the search process. Given the wage-offer distribution, the bolder a person's search strategy (i.e. the higher one's asking wage W*) the higher the wage he expects to accept. Thus, the observed wage distribution has to be adjusted for differences in the search policy.
Nowhere is this bias more serious than in the case of the secondary labor-force groups. These groups are characterized by partial participation in the labor force, indicating that portions of the wage offer distribution faced by these groups are considered too low to be acceptable. The observed wage distribution is a truncated section of the wage-offer distribution and its parameters depend on the parameters of f(W) as well as on the truncation point W. Unless variations in W are corrected for one is bound to obtain biased estimates of the parameters of f(W).
Let us consider two groups of women who face the same wage-offer distribution, f(W), have the same costs of search, C, and the same discount rate. Let it also be assumed that both groups have the same price-of-time distribution except that the mean price of time ( 
This rate is inversely related to the mean price of time (and to K)
Given the wage-offer distribution, the price of time w9 determines the asking wage W, which in turn determines the average acceptable wage E1. Given a sufficiently long period of search (a large enough n), the average wage of the labor force participants in a certain group equals
It can be shown that when g(W0) is log-convex (a property which holds for most functions which we have in mind) a leftward shift in the price-of-time distribution (i.e. a decline in K) results in a reduction of the wage demands and the average wage,7 d/dPwo > 0.
For example, let us assume two groups of married women, say whites and non-whites, with the same market characteristics (e.g. education and work experience), If there were no discrimination, and ignoring differences in psychic incomes, both groups should face the same wage offer distribution f(W) (Figure 1 ). But, if an average white woman places on her time at home a higher value (W0)' than an average nonwhite because of her husband's higher earnings and the existence of other sources of income, her wage demands (W*) will be higher, and her realized average wage CE) will be higher, though the probability that she participates in the labor force may be lower. A comparison of the average wages of working women belonging to the two groups and may lead to the conclusion that non-white women are discriminated against, while in effect discrimination is nonexistent.
On the other hand, if the two groups have the same price-oftime distribution, the same C and r, and the same wage-offer distribution except for a shift factor, then by (11) and (14) the difference in the critical price of time (W0) between the two groups is equal to the difference between their mean wage offers. We shall expect the group with the higher mean wage offer to have the higher
• participation rate [d0/dp = dO/dW0 = g(W0) > 0]. The increase in the average wage however falls short of the increase in the mean wage offer, 
EN Ew Wage offers
Thus, if it is assumed that education affects market productivity (and hence the wage-offer distribution) but does not affect non-market productivity and the price of time, women with higher education are expected to have a higher participation rate. The average wage of these women however increases more slowly than their mean wage offers. These conclusions will hold even if we remove the assumption that education does not affect non-niarket productivity as long as it is assumed that its effect on market productivity exceeds that of non-market productivity The difference in participation can be explained by the lower wage-offer distribution facing women, and probably by their higher value of time in the absence of market opportunities. Both factors tend to increase the difference between the average acceptable wage and the mean wage offer.
It has been estimated (Fuchs, 1971) Age-wage profiles (or age-earning profiles) are used frequently to estimate the rate of depreciation of human capital (Rosen, 1972) and the rates of return to education and on-the-job training. Retirement may introduce a bias in the estimate of the rate of depreciation and obsolescence of human capital. The direction of the bias is however indeterminate. it depends on who is the first to retire, those with the high wage offers or those with the low wage offers. The increase in non-human capital with age may increase the shadow price of time, which will rise more for those who benefited over time from the higher wage offers, so that they will be the first to retire. On the other hand, the margin between the market wage and the home wage is smallest for those at the lower tail of the wage distribution. Any deterjorjatjonin wage offers may therefore make them leave the labor force.
Likewise, as argued above, inter-educational variations in the participation rates may bias the estimated rate of return on investment in human capital of women. It is well established that women's labor force participation increases with education. Put differently, an increase in education shifts the wage-offer distribution by more than it increases the woman's price of time at home (the latter increases either because of the effect education may have on her home productivity and/or because of the increased, probability that she is married to a man with higher earnings). Ignoring the effect education may have on the dispersion of the wage-offer distribution, the difference between the observed average wage rate (E) and the mean wage-offer distribution shrinks with education.8 The difference between the observed wages of working women in two education groups therefore tends to understate the difference between their mean wage offers and the estimated rate of return to education.
It has been argued (Michael and Lazear, 1971 ) that the woman's wage rate may be affected by the number and age composition of her children.
The existence of young children increases the demand for the wife's time at home and her price of time and reduces her tendency to participate in the labor force. Leaving the labor market may accelerate the depreciation of the woman's market-oriented skills and shift her wageoffer distribution downward. However, the decline in the wage-offer distribution does not necessarily result in a decline in the observed wage of working mothers. If the increase in these women's wage demands is sufficiently large it will offset the decline in the wage offers and result in an increase in the observed average wage.9
The determinants of ].abor force participation: Labor force participation increases with the mean of the wage-offer distribution and declines with W0. A prerequisite for the estimation of the determinants of participation is knowledge of the distribution of the price of time at home (Ben-Porath, 1973; Gronau, 1973b; Lewis, 1971 ).
However, this information is insufficient unless supplemented by knowledge of the mean wage offer. Replacing the latter by the average observed wage yields only imperfect estimates of the parameters of the labor force participation function, unless dne knows the relationship between the average wage and the mean wage offer (dE/dpw).
It was shown that an increase in the mean wage offer leads to an increase in the observed wage (E), but that this increase is smaller than the original shift in p. Differences ii% the observed wages of different, say, education groups therefore tend to understate the difference between the mean wage offers and to overstate the sensitivity of participation rates of changes in wages. Furthermore, since the correlation between and E is not perfect, the misspecification of the wage variable introduces errors of measurement into the equation which may also bias the other estimates of the determinants of labor force participation.
The Estimation of the Wage Offer Distribution
The observed wage distribution is only one section of the wage-offer distribution, namely those wages that exceed the asking wage W* where the price of time of the job seeker falls short of W0. To prevent the kind of selectivity bias discussed in the preceding section the original wage-offer distribution must be generated. The derivation of the wageoffer distribution from the truncated observed distribution is a difficult task even if the point of truncation (i.e. W*) is known, and it verges on the impossible when W* and its determinants, i.e. the price of time, the costs of search, and the rate of discount are not known. In the following section I adopt an oversimplified version of the search model.
This section is therefore merely illustrative, serving, it is hoped, as a base point for future research.
Let it be assumed that the job seeker is aware of the best offer he can attain10 W and let his policy be to stay out the labor force if his price of time W0 exceeds his best offer W and otherwise to accept the wage offer W. Given these oversimplified assumptions the participation rate is
where g(w) is the density function of the differential w = W -W0. The average wage of working women is
ewhere h(W,W°) denotes the joint density distribution of W and W°.
Let it be assumed that h(W,W0) is a bivariatenormal density
where X = (W 
where is the regression coefficient of W0 on W (=pao/a) and
Let it be assumed that the (best) wage offers depend on the woman's race, age, education, and number of children but not on her husband's income.
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The sample can be classified by race, age, education, number of children, and husband's income. Given the rate of participation 0 in each cell, the value of the ratio -(si/a), i.e.
the value satisfying Prob(Z > -p/a) = O,can be generated from the normal tables.'3 Given the value of -(p/a) one can use the same tables to derive the value of g(Z = -p/a), and hence the value of X.
Assuming that ao does not change with income, one can regress within a race/age/education_number_of-children group j for different income groups E=a . +a .X, 
Oj j where U. is a dummy variable representing race/age/education/nber_of_ children group j, and where a0. = est(llw.).
The Data and the Results
To estimate the wage-offer distribution I used the 1960 Census 1/1000 sample.
I focused on married women, the sample consisting of 26,530
women belonging to urban primary families, spouse present. Assuming that the mean of the wage-offer distribution is a function of race, age, education, and number of children, the data were subclassified by these characteristics: 2 race groups (white, negro) x 4 age groups (below 30, 30-39, 40-49, 50+) x 4 education groups (elementary school, high school, college, and graduate studies)x 3 groups for number of children below the age of 6 (0,1,2+). Since it was assumed that the wife's price of time in the absence of market opportunities is, in addition to these factors, a function of income, the data were further divided by income excluding wife's earnings (12 groups: less than $2,000, 2,000-2, 999, 3,000-3,999,...,9,000-g,999, 10,000-14,999, 15,000-19,999, and 20,000-f) .14 This subclassification yielded 1,152 cells which are the basic observations of my sample. Equation (25) was estimated for 4 groups: whites with no children under 6 years old, whites with one child under 6, whites with two or more children under 6 and non-whites with no children under 6 (the other two groups are too small to allow estimation). The results are presented in Table i .15 All the regressions are significant and all the coefficients of X are positive as expected (they are significant in three out of the four cases, the exception being the regression for non-whites).
Given the estimates of a0 one can compute the median of the lognormal best-wage-offer distribution = exp(a03)].
These estimates are presented in Table 2 and Figure 3 for the group of white women with no young children, together with the original data of the geometric means of the hourly wage rates. The replacement of the average wage of working women by the imputed median wage offers has very little effect on the slope of the early parts of the age profiles, but reverses the slope of the later segment (the exception again being the graduate group). It seems that a married woman faces her peak wage offer at the age of 30-40 when she has elementary or high school education, and at the age of 40-50 when she is a graduate.18
Sixteen observations are too small a sample to derive any strong conclusions. Still, at the risk of seeming foolhardy, i could not resist the temptation to apply to the observations in Table 2 some of the techniques devised and applied with such success by Jacob Mincer (1972) to earnings of prime-age males. Assuming that schooling and on-the-job training involve no direct costs, and that the ratio of "time-equivalent" investment in on-the-job training declines linearly with age (Mincer, 1972, Ch. 3) I estimated the function
where S denotes the number of years of schooling (it was assumed that these are 8, 12, 15 and 18 for the four education groups, respectively), and T denotes the number of years of working experience (defined19 as T = age -S -8). To correct for heteroscedasticity each of the observations was weighted by the number of working women belonging to that age-education group.2° The results of equation (26) are compared with the estimates of a similar regression equation in which the estimated median wage offer is the dependent variable (see Table 3 ).
The strong multico].linearity between the variable T and its square (the simple correlation coefficient is 0.97) undermines the reliability of the estimated effect of market experience.21 Keeping the shakiness of the evidence in mind, it is still iDteresting to compare the coefficients of T and T2. Thus, while the coefficients of both I and T2 in the regression of the average wage rate are positive, implying an upward sloping age-wage profile, the coefficient of 12 is negative when the dependent variable is the imputed wage offers, as one would expect. The wage offers increase at an ever diminishing rate, reflecting the decline in investment in human capital over the life
cycle. An absolute decline in wage offers sets in after 25-30 years of experience (-b2/b3 = 27).
Assuming that education has the same effect on the productivity of time in all its uses-(e.g. work in the market, work at home, education and leisure) the coefficient of years of schooling in equation (26) measures the rate of return to formal education (Mince; 1972, Ch. 3).
The comparison of the coefficient of S in the regression of the wage rate with that of the mean wage offer confirms our prior expectations.
The use of the observed wage rather than the imputed wage offer tends to bias downward the estimated rate of return to schooling. The extent of the bias increases when the experience variables (T and 12) are omitted from the regression.
The data on the average wage rates in the other three groups (white women with young children and non-whites with no young children) ,and consequently the other three regressions ,show no clear systematic pattern The first line of Table 4 describes the (geometric) average wage of working women belonging to the four groups investigated in our study. There are only slight differences in average wages between the three groups of white women, regardless of the number of young children, and there exists a substantial gap between the wage enjoyed by white women and that of non-whites, the latter being less than two thirds of the former. As the second line of this table indicates, this pattern is little affected by using as weights the total number of women belonging to a cell rather than the number of the working women belonging to the cell.
The average wage of each group naturally depends on its age and educational composition. To standardize for differences in composition one has to use a uniform weighting scheme. The weights used to compute the "standardized potential wage rate" (line 3) are the number of white women without young children belonging to the age and education group.
The isolation of the age and education effect only slightly reduces the white non-white differential (from 0.61 to 0.65) but changes the wage hierarchy of the white women. Thus, while the unstandardized figures
give an edge to women without young children (the wage of women with 2 young children being 87 percent of the wage of women without young children) this relationship is reversed when one accounts for age and education differences between the groups (the ratio becoming 1.07). These figures thus appear to contradict the hypothesis that children result in accelerated depreciation of the mother's market skills.23
The replacement of the average wage by the standardized imputed median wage offer (line 4) leads to significant changes in the observed wage pattern. The effect of children on the mother's wage offers turns out to be a prominent feature of the wage structure. The wage a white mother with two young children can expect to get in the market is only two thirds of that of a woman belonging to the same age-education group who does not have young children.
(On the other hand, one young child does not seem to affect his mother's wage offers.)
Furthermore, the removal of the selectivity bias seems to remove over one half of the white/non-white differential (non-whites' wage offers being 85 percent of those of whites), calling for major revisions in the evaluation of the importance of discrimination as a factor affecting the wage structure of non-white women.
On the other hand, it seems that the estimate of the male-female differential must be revised upwards. The median wage offer of married women is only about 70 percent of the standardized average wage.
Since the male labor-force participation rate is close to 100 percent, the data on their wages is hardly affected by the selectivity bias (X being very close to zero). The comparison of wage offers of males and females would therefore show a substantially larger differential than the 3:2 ratio quoted earlier in this paper.
Finally, it has been argued (Lewis, 1971 ) that using the average wage of working women rather than their mean wage offer results in an upward bias in the estimated effect of wages on labor force participation.
I have elsewhere (Gronau, l973a) used the results presented in Table 2 to estimate the price-of-time distribution and the implicit participation function of American married women. Employing probit analysis I examined the effect of the woman's and her husband's age and education, family income, and the number and age composition of the children on her price of time, i.e. her labor force participation (I allowed the effect of children to differ according to their mother's education).
The results of this analysis are reproduced in Table 5 , where one regression contains the (geometric) average wage rate of working women as an explanatory variable, and the other regression uses our estimate of These results clearly confirm our expectations. The introduction of the wage offers as an explanatory variable considerably reduces the estimated wage effect. The misspecification of the wage variable also affects the estimated effects of other variables, notably the wife's age and education.24 We have seen earlier that the observed wage of working women belonging to the 50+ age group considerably overstates the wage offers faced by their non-working counterparts. The decline in labor force participation witnessed in that group is therefore attributed to age, while essentially it is merely a wage effect.
Likewise, changes in the observed wage tend to understate the changes in the wage offers associated with an increase in education. Using the average wage of working women tends to overplay the direct effect of education on labor force participation.25
The data on the hourly wage rate used in our estimates are far from perfect. One might prefer a long term measure of participation, say, -33-annual rather than weekly participation. Data problems are enhanced by a set of admittedly very strong assumptions, notably the assumption of homoscedasticity of the price of time and the wage-offer distribution.
Finally, the estimation model is based on a search model that is clearly sub-optimal. Thus one should regard the results of this section as no more than an empirical exercise. One should strive to overcome these shortcomings by using a better suited body of data, by assuming a different joint distribution of W and W0 that calls for weaker assumptions, or by focusing on a different statistic (e.g. the standard deviation of the wage of working women).26 Nevertheless, it seems, at least to me, that the evidence collected here is a strong enough warning that comparisons of wage data should take selectivity bias into account.
and Z0
-(p/a).
where = P(ao/a) is the regression coefficient of W0 on W. The mean value of c is zero and its variance is a2 = ao(1 -p2). Define the standardized variable A = €/a, and let
where A = -p/V'a2 a2) and B = a/4a2 -a2).
The conditional expectation
* This appendix is based on the extensive comments of Gregg H. Lewis. . (Gronau 1971 , McCall 1970 , Morténsen 1970 , Phelps 1970 . For other applicatjonsand a survey of the theory see Nelson, 1970 and Rothschild, 1971. 2One of the few exceptions is Lewis (1971 Mortensen (1970) , is based on somewhat simplified assumptions.
The use of a more sophisticated approach would not have affected our major conclusion that there is a positive correlation between the initial wage demands and the accepted wage.
4For a more rigorous proof of this statement see McCall (1970) and Mortensen (1970 diminish, or if the job seeker changes his evaluation of f(W) as the result of the search (see Gronau, 1971 ).
5lnserting (5) and (1) in (4) W
n n+l n n+1
Rearranging terms, one obtains equation (6).
6Thus, I rule out the possibility that the employer is aware of the job seeker's search strategy and adapts his wage offer accordingly. hK(WO)/hK(wO)
= (e/e){g(wO 
10
.
Note that from this point on W denotes the best wage offer and f(W) denotes the best_wage-offer distribution rather than the wageoffer distribution. 14This classification is very similar but not identical to the one I used before (Gronau, 1973b) .
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Instead of equation (25) However, I have not recalculated the t coefficients. Thus, the t.
coefficients (j = 1,... ,l5) presented in Table 1 reflect the significance of the differential between the mean wage offers of the j-th group and the base group (i.e. they serve to test the hypotheses H0 : = while the t coefficient for the base group measures how significantly different is the mean wage offer of this group from zero (i.e.
H. : p =0).
3 wO flatness may be partly due to a cohort effect, and does not necessarily imply that women entering the labor force now can expect no increase in their wage rates.
170f course, this may be merely due to the crude aggregation of the wage data. The expected downward sloping portion of the age-wage profilemjghthave emerged had I used a more refined age classification.
However, it is noteworthy that Arleen Leibowitz, who fitted a quadratic function to data of weekly wages of married women who are full time workers, found that the wage rates tend to decrease only after 43 years of experience when the woman is a high school graduate, and after 60 years of experience when she has 13 years of schooling or more (Leibowitz 1972, p. 43) . This would imply that the peak of the age-wage profile is reached at the age of 61 if the woman is a high school graduate and at the age of 83 if she finished college (the regression coefficients in the case of elementary school are insignificant).
18The negatively sloping portion of the wage-offer profiles may, of course, be due purely to inter-cohort differences.
19Age is assumed to be 26, 35, 45 and 55 in the four age groups, respectively.
20The major conclusions of this analysis would not have changed had I used a different weighting scheme, e.g. estimating an unweighted regression or weighting each observation by the total number of women belonging to that group. 210ne should not conclude from the low t-values associated with T and T2 that length of work experience does not play any role in the determination of wage rates of married women. The omission of T2 from equation (26) results in the coefficient of T becoming significantly different from zero (see also Leibowitz 1972, p. 43) .
22Any attempt of this kind in the case of white women with young children would have proved futile in the face of the large number of empty cells in these groups.
23This statement has to be qualified since the results presented in Table 4 are not standardized for the number of children older than six. Assuming a, and°W O are constant one can regress S on X(X + Z) to obtain independent estimates of these parameters.
